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Mitchell: Mitchell: Unconscionable Construction

Unconscionable Construction: How
the Ninth Circuit Evades the FAA by
Severing Arbitration Agreements as
Unconscionable
Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. FastBucks FranchiseCorp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Some courts engage in a practice of covert construction to vindicate state policies in lieu of applying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 2 By doing so, they
abuse the FAA's savings clause and exhibit hostility to arbitration and the strong
national policy in favor of arbitration.
One example of covert construction to
abuse the FAA's savings clause is the widespread use of the doctrine of unconscionability to refuse enforcement of contractual terms that do not "shock the
conscience." 4 The doctrine of unconscionability is a sloppy tool, and is only appropriate when used as a last resort, When used excessively, the doctrine looks
more like a way for judges to exploit the FAA's savings clause in order to avoid
arbitration and reach the merits of a dispute and affect social policies.
Bridge Fund illustrates a recent manifestation of an ongoing judicial hostility
to arbitration. As the Supreme Court has developed its FAA jurisprudence to limit
the severance of arbitration agreements, many lower courts have continued to
develop legal justifications to circumvent these restrictions. The FAA's savings
clause does afford some latitude for severance of arbitration agreements, but the
Supreme Court has not yet defimed the limits of the savings clause, nor whether
the general contract defenses and their justifications are sufficient to supersede
FAA policy. Bridge Fund shows how the doctrine of unconscionability is being
used to advance state consumer protection policies not as a last resort to protect
individual parties from unconscionable agreements. Without a strong tether to
objective standards, using the doctrine of unconscionability to sever arbitration
1. Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. FastBucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1- 16 (2010).
3. Federal Arbitration Act savings clause, 9 U.S.C. § 2; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("Section 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements . . . ."); see Karl Llewellyn, Book
Review, 52 HARv. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing 0. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAw (1937)) (paraphrasing Llewellyn's
often quoted sentence "covert tools are never reliable tools").
4. SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (Richard Lord ed., 4th ed. 2001)
(summanzing state by state definitions of what is unconscionable, some notion of shocking to the
conscious is common throughout).
5. An example of an appropriate use of unconscionability to invalidate an arbitration agreement
would be when the arbitration agreement is clearly designed by a party of supenor bargaining power to
avoid the courts and serves solely as an exculpatory mechanism. In effect the weaker party never has
an opportunity for redress for any breach by the stronger party, yet is bound to honor their own obligations or face sanction.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

1

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 13

304

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2012

agreements does little to put drafters of arbitration agreements on notice on how to
draft agreements that will survive an unconscionability analysis. The more difficult it becomes to draft an arbitration agreement that withstands scrutiny from
courts hostile to arbitration, the more expensive arbitration becomes, making it
appealing which is the exact opposite of the purported purpose of the FAA.
Bridge Fund represents an intrusion on party autonomy to choose how they will
resolve their disputes and consequently endangers the use of arbitration as a viable
alternative to traditional litigation.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Bridge Fund Capital Corporation and Big Bad 1, LLC (Bridge Fund) and
FastBucks Franchise Corporation (FastBucks) found themselves in California
state court two years after entering in a payday loan franchise agreement, despite
an arbitration clause in the franchise agreement.6 FastBucks successfully removed
the case to the Eastern District of California seeking to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the franchise agreement. The district court denied the motion
to compel arbitration, finding four of the five clauses in the arbitration agreement
to be unconscionable under California law, therefore making the arbitration
agreement severable from the franchise agreement.8 FastBucks appealed the deni9
al of its motion to compel arbitration to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
FastBucks presented three arguments to the Ninth Circuit: whether the question of arbitrability is to be determined by the arbitrator when no express challenge to the arbitration agreement is in the complaint;o whether the district court
abused its discretion by invalidating the entire arbitration agreement rather than
severing unconscionable provisions;" and whether the franchise agreement's
choice of law provision should have compelled the application of Texas and not
California law of unconscionability. 12
The Ninth Circuit unanimously held against FastBucks with respect to each
issue, holding that submission of the issues to an arbitrator under the rules of the
agreement would adversely affect fundamental policies of California and therefore
be unconscionable to enforce.13 First, the Ninth Circuit dispatched FastBucks'
6. Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., No. 2:08-cv-00767-MCE-EFB, 2008
WL 3876341 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2008), affd and rem 'd, 622 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2010). Bridge Fund
alleged "breach of written franchise contracts, fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, violation
of the California Franchise Investment Law ("CFIL"), unfair trade practices under [California law],"
and that certain provisions of the contract were unconscionable. Id. at * 1-*2.
7. Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. FastBucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
8. Id. at 998-99 ("[T]hat (1) the arbitrator, a Texas bar member, shall hear the dispute in Dallas
County, Texas; (2) the claims subject to arbitration shall not be arbitrated on a class-wide basis; (3)
while the Franchisor may institute an action for temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief,
the franchisee is not afforded the same remedy; (4) there is a one year statute of limitations for all
claims; and (5) the parties are limited to recovery of actual damages, and waive any right to consequential, punitive or exemplary damages.").
9. Id. at 998.
10. Id
11. Id.
12. Id
13. See id at 1003-04. Interestingly Bridge Fund never made any allegation that the decision of an
arbitrator would lead to an unconscionable outcome.
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argument that the issue of arbitrability was for an arbitrator to decide, holding that
its "crux of the complaint" rule allows a court to distinguish a specific challenge
to an arbitration agreement term from a challenge to the agreement as a whole,
despite the challenge not appearing in the complaint.14 Affirming the district
court's application of California law, the Ninth Circuit held that the fundamental
nature of the state policies at issue, specifically unconscionability and fair business practices, gave California a "materially greater interest" in the disposition of
the case." Lastly, the Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district
court, because of the latitude traditionally given to the district court to sever unconscionable provisions or refuse enforcement altogether.' 6 In short, the Ninth
Circuit held that the district court could, sua sponte, construe a challenge to a
contract as a whole to include a specific challenge to an arbitration clause, and
that the absence of one state's fundamental state policies from a choice of law
provision is sufficient to be construed as unconscionable. 7 Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit reached its decision despite the sophistication of the parties who
dealt at arm's length and agreed to use arbitration to resolve their disputes.'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Arbitration agreements have been in use in the United States since the inception of the country, but it was not until 1925 with the passage of the FAA that
arbitration agreements grew teeth.19 One of the purposes of the FAA was to curb
long standing judicial hostility against mandatory arbitration agreements. 20 Application of the FAA is tied to Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.21
Revocability of arbitration agreements which fall within the protection of the FAA
14. Id. at 100 1-02 ("[I]n cases in which the arbitration clause's invalidity is an entirely distinct issue
from the contract claims . . . we would not generally expect the plaintiff to raise claims against the
validity of the arbitration clause in the complaint, because such claims generally would be unrelated to
plaintiffs principle prayer for relief.").
15. Id at 1003-04 (this "maternally greater interest" exists because application of another state's law
could potentially impair California policies); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187 cmt. g (1971) ("To be 'fundamental,' a policy must in any event be a substantial one.").
16. Id. at 1005-06 (The court was convinced that the district judge did not abuse his discretion,
rationalizing that scverability just offending clauses in this instance would have "left almost nothing to
the arbitration clause.").
17. The importance here is the issue of arbitrability. Arbitrators are tasked with deciding if the
contract is valid if a challenge is made, while a court is limited to deciding challenges to the arbitration
agreement. If the arbitration agreement is valid then the court cannot reach the merits of the dispute,
but if the arbitration agreement is not valid and severable, then the court may proceed to the merits of
the dispute. See infra Part Ill A.
18. Bridge Fund, 622 F.3d at 996. I highlight that the two parties here are both businesses and
therefore should not be looked at in the same way as one might expect when having an individual
entering into an agreement with a corporate entity.
19. Imrc S. Szalai, Modern Arbitration Values and the First World War, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 355,
355 (2007).
20. See generally id (discussing how activists for arbitration reform capitalized on the post-World
War I political climate by championing that commercial arbitration agreements could be a means to
end and prevent future wars).
21. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) ("Section 2 ... embodies a clear federal policy of
requiring arbitration unless the agreement to arbitrate is not part of a contract evidencing interstate
commerce or is revocable 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."'); see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2010).
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is limited to "grounds [that] exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract"; among these grounds is the doctrine of unconscionability. 22 Currently,
challenges to arbitration agreements are able to exploit the FAA's savings clause
because of a lack of uniformity as to what general principles of revocability-and,
by implication, the policies that underlie those grounds of revocability-are sufficient grounds for severing an arbitration clause. 23 The lack of uniformity also
presents uncertainty in predicting what kinds of terms will be enforceable in
which jurisdictions, and how contractual terms may be construed by courts. 24 To
protect against the savings clause swallowing the rule, the Supreme Court has
created a scheme where the general contract principles that may invalidate an
arbitration agreement cannot be specific only to arbitration agreements. 25
A. Revocability- Severing an ArbitrationAgreement
The Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. held
that federal law was the appropriate source of law when determining the validity
of a contract involving interstate commerce and containing an arbitration clause.2 6
The Court reasoned that Congress' power to set the substantive rules for adjudication of arbitration agreements logically extended from its power to regulate interstate commerce.27 The use of federal substantive contract law in Prima Paint
ensured that contracts containing arbitration agreements would be enforceable,
despite state laws to the contrary. 28 The arbitration clause could still be severed
but only according to state law principles that apply to all contracts equally. 29
This approach, the Court reasoned, would fulfill the purpose of the FAA "to make
arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so." 30
Approximately twenty years after Prima Paint, the Supreme Court expanded
the application of the FAA to state courts by requiring them to apply the same
federal substantive law analysis from Prima Paint." In Southland Corp. v. Keat-

22. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
23. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The UnconscionabilityGame: Strategic Judgingand the Evolution
of FederalArbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1436-37 (2008) (invalidation of an arbitration
clause must be on grounds applicable to all contracts and not just for arbitration agreements); see also
William G. Phelps, Pre-emption by FederalArbitration Act (9 U.S.C.A. §§ I et seq) of State Laws
Prohibitingor Restricting Formationor Enforcement ofArbitration Agreements, 108 A.L.R. FED. 179
(1992).
24. Phelps, supranote 23.
25. Bruhl, supra note 21, at 1437 (describing this limitation as a "fcderal[ly] impose[d] ... hard-tomonitor duty of evenhandedness").
26. 388 U.S. 395,403-404 (1967).
27. Id. at 405. In its holding the Court noted that challenges of the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement because of a fraudulent contract could be determined by a court by using federal substantive
law without conflicting with Erie, but such a determination would be made by the court and not the
arbiter if the fraud alleged "is a fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself." Id.
28. Id. at 399-400.
29. Id (discussing differing treatments of the "severability" of an arbitration clause under federal
substantive law).
30. Id. at 404.
31. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 35 (1984). Some commentators have described this as a
"reverse-Ene question." David S. Schwartz, The FederalArbitration Act and the Power of Congress
over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 584 (2004) (discussing three methods he observed that "Con-
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ing, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the California Supreme Court that
some specific employment issues could be excluded from arbitration as a matter
of public policy. 32 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that had this claim
been brought in federal court arbitration would have been ordered according to
federal substantive law.33 The Court held that the use of state court proceedings to
34
abrogate the protections of the FAA would promote forum shopping. Additionally, limiting the application of the FAA to federal courts alone would not be consistent with the intent of Congress. 35 Despite expanding the application of the
FAA to state courts directly, the Court reaffirmed that the FAA did not preempt
all state contract law principles so long as those state principles were the same sort
generally applicable to revocation of any provision of a contract. 36
Southland Keating also exposed a rift among the Supreme Court Justices regarding the extent to which the FAA should be applied. In a separate opinion,
Justice Stevens expressed concern that the majority had expanded the intent of
Congress. 37 Justice Stevens concurred with the majority that state legislation designed to "undercut" the enforceability of arbitration agreements in general would
violate the FAA, but reasoned that general contract principles of law or equity
38
could properly be applied according to state policies. Justice Stevens reasoned
that the savings clause in section 2 of the FAA served as an expression of Congress' intent that the FAA does not occupy the entire field of legislation affecting
arbitration agreements. 39 State laws that govern the enforceability of all agreements generally would be acceptable because the effect on arbitration agreements
would be incident to policies that affect all contracts equally. 40 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the dissent, expressed the belief that the FAA was never intended to be
applied in state courts, and that the Court had inappropriately pushed federal substantive law onto the states. 4 ' The majority simply rejected Justice O'Connor's

grcss may influence the procedural aspects of federal rights heard in state courts"); see generally Eric
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 5, 20. California's Franchise Investment Law was interpreted by
the California Supreme Court to require judicial review of all claims brought under that statute. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id at 15.
35. Id. at 15-16 ("[W]c are unwilling to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet
make the right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted.").
36. Id. at 16 n. II ("We agree, of course, that a party may assert general contract defenses such as
fraud to avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement. We conclude, however, that the defense to
arbitration found in the California Franchise Investment Law is not a ground that exists at law or in
equity "for the revocation of any contract" but merely a ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the California Franchise Investment Law.")
37. Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is by no means clear that Congress intended entirely to
displace State authority in this field.").
38. Id. at 14-21.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 18-21; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 469 (1989) (Supreme Court holding that arbitration agreements must be enforced when
properly contracted but rejecting the notion that this is synonymous with enforcement being according
to a "certain set of procedural rules" meaning that if an arbitration contract contains a choice of law
provision, then that states arbitration rules and laws could apply so long as their effect was not contrary
to the intent of the FAA).
41. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 33-35.
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belief that "a state policy of providing special protection ... can be recognized
without impairing the basic purposes of the federal statute."42
The Supreme Court again discussed the limits to enforcing arbitration agreements in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna. 43 The Supreme Court of
Florida refused to compel arbitration, reasoning that the enforcement of an allegedly unlawful contract by compelling arbitration would be against state policy and
general tenants of contract law." The Supreme Court reversed, and in its opinion
outlined two acceptable challenges to the validity of an arbitration agreement.45
The first challenge is an attack against the contract as a whole. 46 This type of challenge will not result in a stay of arbitration because the arbitrator or arbitration
panel makes the threshold decision about the validity of the contract as a whole. 47
The second type of challenge is an attack against the arbitration clause itself.48
The effect of a successful challenge to the arbitration clause alone results in the
severance of the arbitration clause while preserving the contract between the parties. Furthermore, a challenge to an arbitration clause alone is decided by the
courts and not arbitrators, even if the analysis is similar to deciding the validity of
a contract as a whole.49
The Supreme Court, reversing, determined that construing the contract as
"void or voidable" to avoid enforcement of the arbitration clause would lead to an
unnatural reading of the text of the FAA.50 In dicta, the Court inferred that had
the arbitration clause alone been challenged, Prima Paint's severability rule
would control and, assuming the arbitration agreement was defective, the same
result would have occurred.5 ' By voiding an arbitration agreement first-and
therefore removing the contract from the scope of the FAA-a court is free to
settle the dispute.52 The lesson from Buckeye is that severance of an arbitration
agreement is not prohibited by the FAA, and that severance of the arbitration
clause must occur before reaching the merits of the container contract dispute so
that the contract is beyond the scope of the FAA.5 3 Post-Buckeye, contract-construction takes on a new dimension. A socially or politically active judiciary can
strategically construe arbitration agreements to make them severable, and then use
the container contract (whose disputes were expected to be decided in private
arbitration) as a vehicle for vindicating state policies.
B. Unconscionabilitya Covert Tool ForSevering ArbitrationAgreements
California provides several cases that illustrate the tension a court faces when
a contract, subject to compulsory arbitration, implicates a legitimate state inter42. Id. at 21.
43. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
44. Id. at 443, 446.
45. Id. at 444-45, 449.
46. Id. at 444.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 445.
50. Id. at 446-47.
51. Id. at 447.
52. Id. at 448-49.
53. Id 445-46.
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est.54 While the Supreme Court was preparing to hear Buckeye, the California
Supreme Court was deciding Discover Bank v. Superior Court.55 The issue in
Discover Bank was an arbitration agreement that prohibited any class action proceedings by Discovery Bank customers.5 6 The trial court initially entered judgment in favor of Discover Bank, compelling arbitration as required by the judge's
understanding of the FAA.57 However a contradictory opinion by one of California's appellant courts resulted in a stay of arbitration.5 ' The Second California
District Court of Appeals panel affirmed the lower court's initial decision to compel arbitration, agreeing with the assessment that the FAA preempted California's
policy on class action waivers. 59 Faced with a split among its lower courts, the
California Supreme Court granted an appeal.60
The first observation of the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank was
not about the validity of the arbitration agreement, but, rather, the potential for
high power parties to use adhesive contracts to take advantage of consumers and
the possible use of arbitration to prevent judicial review of state public policy
claims.6 ' The court then analyzed California's public policy on class action suits
to determine the enforceability of class action waivers. 62 The court reasoned that
the effect of a contract term which prohibited class action lawsuits was to prevent
complaints from being brought forward, thereby preventing less powerful parties
from vindicating their rights, an outcome contrary to public policy.6 3 As a result,
the class action waiver in Discover Bank was found to be procedurally and substantively unconscionableM Holding the arbitration agreement unconscionable,
the second issue addressed by the court was the preemptive limits of the FAA.
The court found the class action waiver provision void and severable from the
contract as a whole, because the use of arbitration without the opportunity for
class action litigation would prevent the judicial protection of consumers, an unconscionable outcome.66 With the arbitration agreement severed, the contract was
no longer within the protective scope of the FAA and the case was remanded for

54. Despite the opinions that follow, there seems to be an underlying hostility to the contract as a
whole which is used as part of the reasoning that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable.
55. 113 P.3d 1100, 1103-04 (Cal. 2007) (alleging that such class action waivers were unconscionable and unenforceable under California law).
56. Id. at 1103-04.
57. Id. at 1104.
58 Id. Unfortunately for Discover Bank, California's Fourth District Court of Appeals found a near
identical class action waiver unconscionable, so the district court ordered a stay of the arbitration until
its parent district court, the California Second District Court of Appeals, made a ruling.
59. Id at I105 (noting that under some circumstances a class action waiver could be unconscionable
and therefore be severable).
60. Id
61. Id. at 1105-06.
62. Id
63. Id The court reasoned that because a typical dispute between the parties would be over a small
sum of money the arbitration clause disincentivizes individual claimants from vindicating their rights.
Id.
64. Id. at 1108-09. In California an adhesive contract is almost always considered at least procedurally unconscionable, meaning that any substantively unconscionable provision would fulfill the normal
two prong test of procedurally and substantive unconscionability needed to construe a term as void.
65. Id. at 1105-17.
66. Id.
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litigation.67 Nowhere in its analysis did the California Supreme Court require
suggest that an arbitration agreement coupled with a class action waiver actually
or even apparently act as an "exculpatory contract clause ... contrary to public
policy" in order to be unconscionable.6 8
The principle of Discover Bank mirrors the principle later implied by the Supreme Court in Buckeye: unconscionability is a valid way to void and sever an
arbitration agreement. 6 9 This principle was ratified by the Ninth Circuit in Shoyer
v. New Cingular Wireless.70 Shoyer, like Discover Bank, centered on a challenge
to an arbitration clause that also served as a class action waiver. 71 Applying California law, the Ninth Circuit looked to the analysis of Discover Bank and its three
part test to determine whether a class action waiver contained in an adhesion contract was unconscionable.7 2 In holding that the class arbitration waiver in Shoyer
fulfilled all three elements of the Discover Bank test, the Ninth Circuit left open
the possibility that an arbitration agreement/class action waiver provision could be
unconscionable even if all three elements of the Discover Bank test were not satisfied. The Ninth Circuit also asserted that Discover Bank did not require that all
adhesive arbitration agreements be per se unconscionable, although "absent unusual circumstances, use of a contract of adhesion establishes a minimal degree of
procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the availability of market alternatives......

",74

The Ninth Circuit in Shoyer, like the California court in Discover Bank, also
addressed the question of whether the FAA preempted the use of unconscionability to revoke an arbitration clause. 75 The Ninth Circuit echoed the reasoning of
Justice Stevens in Buckeye, holding that § 2 of the FAA serves as a savings
clause, granting the states use of generally applicable contract defenses against
arbitration agreements, and that the intent of the FAA is simply to put arbitration
agreements on the "same footing" as other contracts.7 6 Allowing a class action
waiver to be effective merely because of the existence of an arbitration clause,
67. Id. at 1108-09.
68. Id. at 1108-17.
69. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-48 (2006). Consider, though,
that the ultimate outcome in Buckeye was that the contract as a whole would not be enforced while in
Discover Bank the contract as a whole would remain in force and be decided in court.
70. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007) ("It is wellestablished that unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense, which may render an
arbitration provision unenforceable."). AT&T acquired Cingular before Shoyer was hcard by the Ninth
Circuit.
7 1. Id.
72. Id. at 981-83. The three-part test included: "(1) whether the agreement is 'a consumer contract of
adhesion' drafted by a party that has superior bargaining power; (2) whether the agreement occurs 'in a
setting in which disputes between the contracting partics predictably involve small amounts of damages'; and (3) whether 'it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money."'
Id. at 983 (quoting Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1451-53, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
73. Id at 983.
74. Id. at 985 ("[Tihe doctrine [of unconscionability] has both a procedural and a substantive clement, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on
overly harsh or one-sided results.").
75. Id at 987-93.
76. Id. at 990. Keep in mind this savings clause concept was first voiced by Justice Stevens who was
dissenting in SouthlandKeating.
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when such a waiver would not be allowed in any other contract, would put arbitration agreements on a different footing than an ordinary contract.77 As a result, the
Ninth Circuit held the Discover Bank test applicable to all class action waivers,
78
regardless of the existence of an arbitration provision. The Ninth Circuit flatly
rejected the implied preemption argument that application of Discover Bank to
invalidate class action waivers would obstruct the intent of the FAA by "reduc[ing] the efficiency and expeditiousness of arbitration in general."

IV. INSTANT DECISION
After losing its motion to compel arbitration, FastBucks appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.80 Addressing the issue of arbitrability, the Ninth Circuit engaged in analysis of when a dispute is in the realm of the arbitrator or the court to decide. ' The
court quickly distinguished Buckeye from the present case by highlighting the
difference between challenges to the arbitration agreement (construed into the
challenge to the whole contract by the court) from the direct challenges to the
contract as a whole (as in Buckeye). 82 Because challenges to the arbitration agreement were not the same as the challenges to the contract as a whole, the Ninth
83
Circuit held the ultimate question of arbitrability was properly before the court.
The court then balanced competing policy implications presented by the
84
choice of law provision of the arbitration agreement. The Ninth Circuit found
California to have the greater material interest by determining that application of
Texas law in this dispute would cause fundamental public policies of California to
suffer most.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit applied Discover Bank to determine if the arbitration
agreement was unconscionable and severable. Because the contract was adhesive
86
in nature, the court found the arbitration provision procedurally unconscionable.
because
The arbitration agreement was construed as substantively unconscionable
of the one sided nature of the waiver of statutory rights and the denial of injunctive relief to Bridge Fund. The court concluded that severing only the offending
77. Id.
78. Id. at 988.
79. Id.
80. Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. FastBucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
81. Id. at 1000-02.
82. Id.; see also supra Pt. III.A., 1$ 4-5 (discussing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440 (2006)).
83. Bridge Fund, 622 F.3d at 1002 ("Plaintiffs' argument that the arbitration provision contained in
the franchise agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable ... are clearly arguments marshaled against the validity of the arbitration clause alone, and separate from Plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement claims.").
84. Id. Weighing the interests of the parties in the enforcement of the choice of law provision against
the possible implication of fundamental policy of the state. The purpose was to see if a "substantial
relationship" exists. If the relationship is not "substantial" then the forum state's law (California) is
applicable when it has a "materially greater interest" in the outcome of the controversy.
85. Id. at 1003-04 (discussing the public policy "against enforcing class action waivers . . . in arbitration agreements").
86. Id. at 1004. Although not dispositive, an adhesive contract in California is almost always considered procedurally unconscionable.
87. Id. at 1004-05. Bridge Fund was considered the weaker party to the contract because it did not
draft the agreement and it was essentially written as a take it or leave it deal. Id.
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provisions of the arbitration clause to save the rest of the arbitration agreement
would be impractical because the agreement would be simply agreeing to arbitrate, without anything more to guide the proceeding.88 As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial to compel arbitration and remanded the case
to be heard by the trial court for a decision on the merits.8 9
V. COMMENT: AVOIDING COVERT CONSTRUCTION - CHANGING OUR
APPROACH TO THE FAA
For over 50 years the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an arbitrator is the
decision maker for the determination of the enforceability of a contract containing
an arbitration agreement. 90 Meanwhile, revocation of an arbitration clause based
on general principles of state contract law remains open to judicial review thanks
to the FAA's savings clause, which begs the question to what extent state law can
be used to void an arbitration clause.9' Arbitration has the potential to be in conflict (if not actually in conflict already) with many public policy goals such as
consumer protection laws or class action litigation devices. 92 The Ninth Circuit
has found such importance in state policies such as consumer protection and franchise investment that a violation of them would be unconscionable and therefore
sufficient to sever an arbitration agreement, thus allowing the court to affect public policy by reaching the merits of case. This approach seems to cast doubt on the
Ninth Circuit's trust in arbitration and creates tension with the pro-enforcement
decisions of the Supreme Court. The severance of an arbitration clause changes
the nature of a contract, and the impact of the resolution between the parties
should not be liberally engaged in, or some parties may simply choose to forgo
attempts to enter arbitration agreements because of the potential for added cost
without much confidence in the ability to actually compel arbitration.
The doctrine of unconscionability is highly subjective, and at its most basic
level simply a justification for not enforcing a contract or term that is beyond the
pale. 93 An unconscionability analysis is predictive in nature and results-oriented,
unlike determining the volition of the parties making an agreement. 94 The opinion
88. Id. at 1006.
89. Id.
90. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklim Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400-05 (1967).
91. See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
92. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 7 ("Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one
party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts. Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation,
one of the very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate."); see generally Mo
Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts ofAdhesion and Party Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV.
123, 151 (2008) (stating that other potential issues on the Court's mind include Federalism, and political considerations such as some Congressional hostility to the extent that the FAA has been found by
the Court to be applicable to the states); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong.
§ 2 (2009) (finding that the US Supreme Court has changed the onginal meaning and intent of Congress when it passed the FAA, and among other things that the use of mandatory arbitration "undermines the development of public law for civil rights and public nghts ... ).
93. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (Aspen 3d. cd. 1999) ("[T]hc term is undefinable.").
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. a (1981) ("Occasionally, on grounds of
public policy, legislation provides that specified kinds of promises or other terms arc unenforceable.");
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of Bridge Fund is short on how compelling arbitration would be unconscionable,
long why the court, not an arbitrator, should decide the case, and looks like an
exploitation of the FAA savings clause to reach not only the merits of the case, but
also external policy considerations implicated by the contract. 95
Enforcing adhesive contracts has been a bitter pill for some courts to swallow
since the early 1900s, despite the fact that standardized contracts are often more
efficient and practical than negotiating and drafting a new contract for every
In part, this reluctance can be attributed to judges wedded to the
transaction.
common law ideal of an individual bound to an agreement where presumably
most of the terms of the contract were negotiated.97 This idealized concept does
not take into account the realities of the modern world; it is rare that no bargaining
disparities exist between parties, but still completely foreseeable that all parties
98
The world
desire to "exclude or control the irrational factor[s] [of] litigation."
has changed; choices for essential goods and services have become fewer while
bargaining disparity between parties has become greater.99 Take it or leave it,
bargaining is no longer a viable option to most consumers.100 In the early twentieth century, courts reacted to prevent "freedom to contract" from becoming a "one
sided privilege" and developed a "highly contradictory and confusing" common
law on form contracts that we deal with today. 01 Despite efforts to streamline and
standardize doctrines such as unconscionability, the holdings of Buckeye and
Bridge Fund show the truth of Professor Kessler's observation02that "freedom of
contract must mean different things for different . .. contracts."1
Some scholars have identified the use of unconscionability as one of the most
03
The use of
prevalent challenges to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
unconscionability to sever arbitration agreements has also been recognized as a

see also id. § 162(l), (2) ("[M]isrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends ... to induce a party
to manifest his assent[.1").
95. See generally Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. FastBucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996 (9th Cir.
2010); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 444 n. II (discussing the importance of valid
acceptance of the arbitration agreement as opposed the validity of the contract as a whole).
96. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 n.13 (1943) (crediting E.W. Patterson as the originator of the term "contract
of adheston").
97. Id. at 632.
98. Id.; see also JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS

§ 97

(2001).

99. Kessler, supra note 96, at 633, 640-41. By choices becoming smaller Kessler meant that as
businesses tend to operate essentially the same, the choices for the consumer in what can be truly
bargained for is limited in all practicality even if the selection of goods available increases.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 642. Professor Kessler didn't suggest one way or another if adhesive contracts should be
given special consideration by a court. Instead he simply pointed out that the economic and business
realtics of the modem world presented a more complex environment than traditional common law
principles to contract formation and enforcement gave guidance. Kessler seemed to imply that the
legislature was the key to solving this issue by settling what "dogma" should be followed.
103. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging, and the Evolution of
Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1420, 1466 (2008); see also William H. Baker, Class
Action Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 335 (2009) (explaining the trend of striking class
action waiver in arbitration agreements as unconscionable).
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potential tool for a sort of arbitration-litigation forum shopping.'0 The cost to
defend the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a court hostile to arbitration court provides leverage in negotiation and discourages the use of arbitration. 05 California's law on unconscionability represents a fundamental concept of
contract law: society does not wish to allow a wrongdoer to absolve themselves of
liability by operation of law in the enforcement of a contract. 06 This concept
makes sense, but the instant case lacks even an allegation that the arbitration
serves as an exculpation clause. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that compelling
arbitration according to the terms of the agreement (in large part because of the
"adhesive" form of the agreement) is unconscionable because arbitration would
adversely impact the policies of California. 0 7 This post hoc interjection of the
court in the bargaining process appears to be a departure from the "freedom of
contract" principles that previous courts tried to preserve. 08
One of the purposes of the FAA was to put arbitration agreements on "equal
footing" with ordinary contracts.1 09 However, according to the logic of Shoyer, an
adhesion contract is almost automatically procedurally unconscionable and becomes substantively unconscionable when compelling arbitration would be contrary to any public policy."o Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to hold that all
arbitration clauses in an adhesion contract are per se unconscionable, a sample of
other cases where the Ninth Circuit has used unconscionability to sever arbitration
agreements lends to a cynical view that the court is engaging in covert construction to use unconscionability to sever an arbitration agreement and use the dispute
to further state policies."' Surely Congress did not envision putting arbitration
104. See Bruhl, supra note 103, at 1466; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-16
(1984) (discussing the potential for forum shopping if the FAA were construed as only a "procedural
remedy in the federal courts" instead of binding on state courts as well).
105. See Szalai, supra note 19; see also Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 498 F.3d 976,
981 (9th Cir. 2007) ("It is well-established that unconscionability is a generally applicable contract
defense, which may render an arbitration provision unenforceable."). Even if on later review the decision to sever the arbitration agreement is overturned, the damage is done. After the added time and
expense of litigation, the party who was denied arbitration may well decide that one litigation is more
cost effective than litigating a motion to compel and even is successful having to pay for arbitration
and risk losing in that proceeding.
106. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1668 (2006) ("All contracts which have for their object, directly or
indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the
law.").
107. Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. FastBucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2010)
("Fastbucks would not suffer any undeserved detriment by being forced to litigate this case in California court. Although Fastbucks's arbitration scheme is not illegal, it is inconsistent with California
public policy concerning the rights of California franchisees.").
108. Kessler, supra note 96, at 639. Or, as Professor Kessler put it, those courts convinced about their
role in contract law will be convinced only by that which supports their view.
109. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC., 584 F.3d 849, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2009).
110. Shoyer, 489 F.3d at 982; see also Zhang, supra note 92, at 153 (discussing how when courts
"employ a sliding scale analysis with regard to the presence of the procedural and substantive components of unconscionability - that is, the more significant one is, the less significant the other need
be.").
111. See Laster, 584 F.3d at 849; see also Shoyer, 498 F.3d at 976. It seems the Ninth Circuit has
simply made it an academic exercise of holding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts to be unconscionable, by using the adhesive contract as proof of procedural unconscionability and then inserting a
competing state interest that may be implicated as proof of the substantive unconscionability of private
arbitration.
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agreements on "equal footing" with other contracts only when a dispute might not
further a state policy.11 2 If a challenge to an arbitration agreement for being
"voidable" is insufficient to deny arbitration (as in Buckeye), it does not follow
that a challenge to an arbitration clause for any grounds other than volition should
be decided by anyone other than the arbitrator." 3
Some scholars believe that Congress should act to clarify its intent, or perhaps
change the FAA to effectively reverse Southland Keating.114 If the Supreme
Court continues to bear the burden of clarifying the FAA, one solution might be to
extend its prior holdings and find federal substantive contract law principles to be
the universal standard in determining all challenges to both arbitration agreements
as a whole and arbitration clauses individually." 5 This could create a (more) unified concept of what is unconscionable, to be applied evenly to all arbitration
agreements affecting interstate commerce."' 6 Such a decision would also limit
forum shopping by those trying to compel arbitration in U.S. District Court and
those seeking to avoid arbitration in state court.117
Professor Andrew Bruhl identified several other methods that the Supreme
Court could use to deal with the rising tide of unconscionability as a method of
challenging class action waiver arbitration agreements." 8 One method in particular appears most consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of the FAA and
utilizes the so called "separability doctrine" to shift an unconscionability determination from the court to an arbitrator. Professor Bruhl's proposal requires a high
degree of confidence in the arbitration process and trusts that an arbitrator will act
fairly, impartially, and, if necessary, against his own interests." 9 Until Congress
takes action or the Supreme Court provides more guidance, it is likely that courts
such as the Ninth Circuit will continue to use the doctrine of unconscionability as
a tool to sever arbitration agreements from standardized contracts and decide the
merits of the case. There must be some objective forewarning of the contours of
unconscionability to allow parties the greatest opportunity to contract out of litiga-

112. Id. This not only looks like analysis of whether the arbitrator will decide the issue incorrectly,
but also hints at an undertone that there is a limit to what parties can bargain for, or at least bargain to
arbitrate over.
113. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448-49 (2006) ("It is true, as
respondents assert, that the Prima Paint rule permits a court to enforce an arbitration agreement in a
contract that the arbitrator later finds to be void. But it is equally true that respondents' approach permits a court to deny effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that the court later finds to be perfectly enforceable. Prima Paint resolved this conundrum-and resolved it in favor of the separate enforceability of arbitration provisions."); see also Baker, supra note 103, at 335 (providing an overview
of recent developments in the area of class arbitration including general arguments in favor and against
such proceedings).
114. Bruhi, supra note 23, at 1487; see, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S.B. 931, 11Ith Cong.
§ 2(5)(2009).
115 Bruhi, supra note 23, at 1483-87. In no way does this author suggest that this would be a preferred solution.
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (requiring states to apply substantive federal contract law principles for all arbitrations that would fall under the FAA).
118. See generally Bruhl, supra note 23.
119. Id at 1470-72. The issue of an arbitrator making a determination of if he or she can hear a dispute has clear conflict of interest and ethical dilemmas, compounded by the fact that for the most part,
arbitration decisions are final and binding.
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tion and into arbitration.120 More guidance on the use of an "undefinable" standard to invalidate arbitration agreements is needed to counter the appearance, if not
actual use, of "covert tools" that nullify the parties' abilities to choose their own
method of dispute resolution.121
VI. CONCLUSION
When arbitration is bargained for, the effect of an arbitration decision on unnamed parties should not be relevant; the decision is not binding on third parties.
Unless it is clear that arbitration is being used to discourage parties from bringing
legitimate claims, or is merely a screen from liability, enforcement should not
depend on other policies not immediately related to the parties.122 Unconscionability as a means to sever arbitration agreements appears to be a clumsy tool and
should be used sparingly to avoid stretching the concept of what is unconscionable
beyond what little consensus there is on the subject. If unconscionability is to be
the basis of non-enforcement, it should be limited to instances where compelling
arbitration would be unconscionable to one of the parties.
Modem economic practices require the use of standardized contracts. Arbitration avoids the cost and time of litigation and offers the potential for personalized justice that cannot be replicated in the court system. Without predictability of
what terms will survive a searching unconscionability analysis, challenges to arbitration agreements raise the overall cost of arbitration, and also diminish the incentives to arbitration that the FAA was drafted to protect. Arbitration should not
become an exculpation device for the powerful, but the use of discreet and subjective principles to sever an arbitration agreement is likely to lead only to more
complex contractual language, or a movement away from arbitration altogether.
A system without clear rules for severability detracts from the "promot[ion] [of] . .
. efficient and expeditious resolution of claims," and unnecessarily creates conflict
between federal and state policies.123
DANIEL

B.

MITCHELL

120. Bruhl, supra note 23, at 1479 (providing an example of a circumstance in which a party with
clearly superior bargaining power is using arbitration as a pretense to contract itself out of liability as
described by the court in Discover Bank).
121. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS

§ 4.28

(Aspen 3d. ed. 1999) (attempting to show that

unconscionability is as a "term ... undefinable.").
122. An example of an intent to avoid liability would be in circumstances were little money is normally in dispute and the terms of the arbitration agreement make it unlikely or burdensome to vindicate
ones rights in arbitration. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761
(2011) (discussing how use of arbitration can be used to disincentivize claims).
123. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) cert granted,130 S. Ct. 3322,
176 L. Ed. 2d 1218 (U.S. 2010). Laster preceded FastBucks and was heard by the US Supreme Court
as AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, and once decided may clarify the extent that unconscionability
may be used to sever arbitration provisions from a contract). See also Concepcion 131 S. Ct. at 1753
(2011) (abrogating Discover Bank v. Superior Court for "stand[ing] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.").
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